Ethics is a science dealing with morality. It studies the laws of the nature and the origins and development of morality. It studies the moral rules of human action and the scope of morality. It also studies the social function of morality and promotes methods of moral education, or moral cultivation.

Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought is the theoretical basis on which our Party formulates its correct line, principles and policies. It is also the guiding thought for the whole nation. In the past, it was by relying on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought that we won the victory in the new democratic revolution and carried on the more than twenty years of socialist revolution and socialist construction. From now on, in our effort to achieve our Party's general task in the (...) new stage of development, to persistently carry on revolution under the proletarian dictatorship, conduct the Three Great Revolutionary Movements of class struggle, struggle for production and scientific experiment, and build our country into a great, powerful socialist state with modernized agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology before the end of the century, we must also rely on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. (shrink)

本书将牟宗三哲学研究置于当前国内外关于牟氏研究现状的大环境, 大视野之中, 着眼于牟氏道德的形上学, 紧扣牟氏著述文本, 不仅考察和梳理了牟宗三的学思历程, 学术资源, 而且重点从良知论, "现象" 与 "物自身", 两层存有论, 内圣与新外王, 宗教论, 圆善论, 道德的形上学之完成等方面展开对牟宗三哲学的阐发和剖析.

本书主要内容包括:超越西方哲学传统;反基础主义纲领;心理学唯名论;行为主义知识论;没有世界的真理观;后哲学文化;无本体论的伦理学等.

本书共有五章,内容包括精神科学的缘起、精神科学的体系、精神科学的基本对象、精神科学的认识逻辑、狄尔泰与现代西方哲学。.

he primary aim of Dworkin's essay is to defend the claim that there are objective moral (and aesthetic or otherwise evaluative) truths against a variety of "external" skeptical challenges. These challenges are "external" because they "offer to justify their skeptical claims -- that these [evaluative] domains cannot provide objective truth -- from premises that are not themselves evaluative." (p. 88).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS AS A COMMENTATOR ON DE ANIMA 3.5 JAMES T. H. MARTIN St. John's University Jamaica, New York DOES ST. THOMAS AQUINAS in his commentary on De Anima 3.5 provide an acceptable gloss on Aristotle 's cryptic remarks about active mind? That is, can one accept.that what Aquinas says about active mind is what Aristotle meant but for some reason did not say? Many modern commentators, among them (...) Franz Brentano, Marcel de Corte, Paul Siwek, and Francisco Peccorino, appear to think so and present an interpretation of active mind which agrees substantially with what Aquinas says in his Sententia Libri De Anima (Sent.).1 i Senteiitia Libri De Anima, opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita (Paris: Vrin, for the Leonine Commission, 1984). While he does criticize St. Thomas Aquinas for some statements which " seem to betray a certain lack of clarity concerning the nature of active intellect,'' Franz Brentano awards the first place among earlier commentators on Aristotle's doctrine of active mind to Aquinas : " Indeed, I am not sure whether I should not say that he correctly grasped Aristotle's entire doctrine" (The Psychology of Aristotle: In Particular His Doctrine of Active Intellect, ed. and trans. Rolf George [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977], p. 155). De Corte holds that the originality of his study consists entirely in combining " all the technical means refined by modern criticism and which the thirteenth century did not have at its disposition " with the " Thomist interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of intelligence," an interpretation with which de Corte agrees, and which he presents as a necessary correction of the errors of modern commentators, who are "more or less instilled with an unconscious Averroism which radically vitiates their power of understanding" (La doctrine de l'intelligence chez Aristote [Paris: Vrin, 1934], p. 2). Siwek notes that "many of St. Thomas's explanations of Aristotelian psychology are altogether consonant with our own explanations,'' and warns his readers against undervaluing Aquinas's views (Aristotelis Tractatus de Anima Graece et Latine, editit, versione latina auxit, commentario illustravit [Rome: Desclee & C.i, 1965], p. 30). Peccorini com621 622 JAMES T. H. MARTIN Aristotle's text is concerned with two minds, "a mind which is such as matter by becoming all things, and another which is such as an active principle by making all things" (430a14-15). What are these minds, and what do they do? The central elements of Aquinas's exegesis of De Anima 3.5 consist in his answers to these questions. He holds that these two minds are " parts or potencies of the soul " (Sent. 3.4. 126). The role of passive mind, the "mind which is such as matter," is to apprehend the intelligible object (Sent. 3.4. 101-2), while that of active mind, the mind " which is such as an active principle by making all things," is to abstract the intelligibles (Sent. 3.4. 103-4), a role which he explains in this way: Active mind makes those things intelligible in act which previously were intelligible in potency. It does this by abstracting them from matter, for in this way they are intelligible in act, as has been said. Aristotle was led to posit an active mind to exclude the opinion of Plato, who held that the natures of sensible things are separated from matter and actually intelligible. Thus for Plato it was not necessary to posit an active mind. But because Aristotle holds that the natures of sensible things are in matter and not actually intelligible, it was necessary that he posit a certain intellect to abstract them from matter and so make them actually intelligible. (Sent. 3.4 50-63) Active mind on Aquinas's reading makes the potentially intelligible forms of sensible things actually intelligible, and in this way these sensible things become objects of thought. If one accepts this role for active mind, one is forced to accept as well, I think, that active mind is part of the soul rather than something separate from the knowing human subject. Aquinas argues this point at length in his commentary on De Anima 3.5. If thinking, the action of the passive mind, is in fact... (shrink)

Arguments that Aquinas’s literal commentaries on Aristotle present his own philosophy are often proxies for larger claims about the relation of philosophy to theology. While trying to secure a place for Thomas in philosophic conversation, such arguments impose modern notions of an autonomous and apodictic philosophy, with fixed genres of declarative speech. The result is neither a plausiblereading of the Thomistic corpus nor a helpful exemplar for contemporary Catholic philosophy.

Analyses the exegetical strategies of the Neoplatonist Simplicius.

A reply to a critic who, by his very criticisms, demonstrates my point about analytic philosophy's narrow-minded approach to differing styles of exposition.